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-,ijEVOlUtR)1 of Today'sRond Mark't
IIitoriL
In thosedays one bond aweek would keep a man alive, three bondsa
%eek wouldbe prosperity ten bonds a week would be affluence. So he
wentpeddlitig around the statelookmg tor prosperous storekeepers, to-
bacco farmers,druggists, who might buy one or two IX)fldS, or country
banks thatmight buy five or more. He did svell, and in live years of so he
had
accumulated enough capital to start his own firm. That is a picture of a
retail bondmarket, perhaps not entirely representative, but in the main
valid.
Those were nothigh-grade bonds and so had to be retailed in out-of-
the.wayplaces to private investors. However, the record of those western
utilities wasexcellent, and twenty years later many of them were called
and otherseventual!Y became legal. The prime bonds, in the decade
ending in 1910, werethe rails, like the New York Central first 3½s of 1997
noncallable. Prime new issues were also underwritten on a negotiated
basis, but these werelisted on the New York Stock Exchange, grabbed up
by sophisticated investors,and if well priced they sold at quick premiums.
Indeed, between 1880 and 1900,when prime yields moved from 41/z
percent to 31/8percent, fortunes were made by capitalists carrying big
blocks of such bonds on credit. They were usually 1 00-yearmaturities and
noncaliable. One popular issue matured in 2361.The basic business was
retailsmall, country investors or big-city investors. Underwritingspreads
were so large as tomake methodical widespread distribution profitable to
dealers even if unit transactions were small. This is not true today.
THE 19205
Is'ill now jump to the mid-1920s when I began my career in Wall Street.
From 1923 to 1930 prime, long-term bond yields were remarkably stable
at about percent.Ido not recall much interest rate speculation;
probably the memories of the bond market collapse of 1920 were still
green, when yields soared to 5'/2 percent and the old prime 3V2 percent
bonds declined briefly to a price of 64. But there was a good active bond
business and lots of underwriting and distribution to private investors and
now also to institutions. Good bonds were mostly listed, and theprivate
investors bcught and sold on the exchange.
Institutions, however, liked round lots (in those days this usually meant a
hundred bonds, occasionally $1 million), and it was hard to buy such lots
on the exchange except for a few very active issuesUsually relatively new
issues. So institutions often waited for new issues where they could buy in
s:ze. At times they could buy new issues at a lower wholesale priceand





firms that made it their bUsineSs to accumulate bonds üii the
exchange maybe one to five at a time, until they had collçteI lO0-bond
loo more; and then they put theblock on their list at a worthwhilemark)
and sold the block to some savings bank or insurance company. It
was usually
recognized that in a stable market a seasoned round lotwas worthmore than an odd lot. Such trades then began on the floor (accunirilation)
and ended over the counter (distribution).
At this point I should mention a fact that is often overlooked.
American business obtains its external financing primarily in the
OVeNthe..counfer market through underwritings of bond and stock issuesor direct borrowing
from institutions.It much less often looks to theexchanges forlarge amounts of new capital and then mostly from rights issues.
The importance
of our secondary markets, both listed and unlisted, ischiefly toprovide the initial investors with liquidity. If there wereno secondary markets
not so many investors would buy new issues of either bonds
or stocks Good
secondary markets are basic to oureconomy, but are not primarily
a direct source of new capital.
THE DEPRESSION
I will now pass to the 1 930s,a period which separated the sheep fromthe
goats: in the panic, the yields on sound medium-gradebonds, say A rated.
rose from 5 percent to as much as 1 5percent (a price decline of perhaps
70 percent), while at the verysame time prime corporate bond yields
declined from 4½ percentto 2/4 percent (a price rise ofperhaps 42
percent if noncallable). Most of those bondissues that had been distributed
to the public in earlier decades sufferedone of four fates: they defaulted,or
they lost caste and declinedsteeply, or if they did not losecaste rose
steeply in price,or they were called ii callable.
According to Brad Hickman'swonderful corporate bond studies,1x,
tween 1900 and 1943, $71 billionpar value of straight bonds of American
corporations were sold, of which1 8 percent defaulted, 12percent were paid in full atmaturity, 37 percentwere called, and 26 percent ss'ere
outstanding at the endwith a perfectcontractual record. These figures
seem to reveal theprocesses by which private investors,once the mainstay of the corporate bondmarket, lost three-quartersof their bondholdings: by default, by call,and by maturity.

















new bondissues and also bought seasoned issues that were beingsold at
depressed prices by other institutions and private investors. At that time
1onipctitive bidding for new issues became common, and sonic institutions
experimented with bidding, often to their sorrow. There were alsoa few
"best efforts" new issues.
The corporate bond business became almost wholly an institutional
business in the 1 930s.Often the dealers bought blocks of bondsat deeply
depressed prices from deposit institutions that were forced by examiners to
liquidate, and the dealers then sold the bonds to strong life insurance
companies. In those days, although most large corporate bond issues were
stilllisted, block transactions in high-grade bonds were mainly over the
counter while low-priced, active, si'eculative bonds traded partly on the
exchange and partly over the counter. The exchange tried hard to retain its
bond business by means of a series of regulations requiring members to
trade smaller lots on the exchange, or at least try to, but those efforts did
not affect trades in large lots and without the public the small-lot business
dried up, and the large-lot business came to dominate the market.
In the worst part of the depression a great deal of round-lot bond
business was done with institutions on an order basis without involving
dealer capital, that is to say, a liquidating institution would give a dealer a
firm order to sell a block of inactive bonds at a price higher than was
obtainable from dealer bids, and the dealer would check his institutional
customers in an effort to find a buyer and often succeeded.
To large institutions the advantage of over-the-counter bond transactions
became obvious. Imagine for a moment that you are the trader for a life
insurance company. One morning your boss walks up to you and says,
"We just approved $1 million X 7s at about 90." The bonds are listed, and
you could call your broker and find that on the board the bonds are quoted
90-90Y2, ten up. You could buy the ten bonds and put him to work buying
990 more at about the same price.It might take a month, and your
persistent buying would surely push the market up. Alternatively, you
could call the right over-the-counter dealer, dicker with him, and buy the
whole million in five minutes. Thus, the bond market on the floor was
suitable for private investors, but not for institutions, with the exception
perhaps of extemely active issues and convertibles. For these reasons, the
market for high-grade bonds left the floor and came almost entirely to the
over-the-counter market where buyer and seller could come face to face
and talk in size. People love to dicker, and you cannot dicker very well at
second hand, or third hand, with the whole world listening in.
I will pass over the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s quickly, as you are all
familiar with those markets. Our corporate bond markets were almost
entirely institutional affairs. Private investors ignored high-grade corporate
bonds, and speculators concentrated on governments where they often
381 HitoriCEvolution of Today's Bond Marketfared poorly. New-issue underwriting at times reached
massive Secondary markets were often active, but alniustentirelyflroufl(j lots because the buyers an(I sellers both werelfiStitUtjn5It wdsUsually v hard to buy or sell small lots on or oil the boardPrivate
Placement became common.
THE PRESENT
I now come to the period from 1968 to date.In 196)IflSttUtjOflS eitherran out of funds or concentrated on equities in which
experience hadbeen excellent. When bond yields soared to 6percent, 7 percent
8 percent 9.35 percent, private and miscellaneousinvestors returnedto the bond market in size, at times taking almost halfthe total offered.
Those were the days of disinterniediation. Asa result the bond market founda floor Aftera rally of a few years the marketagain declined tonew low levels.
Yields rose higher than ever, and private investorswere again very active
buyers. Private and miscellaneous investors'net purchases ofcorporate bonds rose from $2 billion in 1968 to $7 billionin 1969 and to $10billi0 n 1970 (when a grand total of$30 billion was pouredby thesenew buyers into all sorts of creditinstruments).2 Ever since,private andmiscellaneous investors have been putting$6 billion to $10 billiona year net into corporate bonds, and thatrepresents about a third of thenet new issues of corporate bonds. This year theirtotal input into thismarket will, no doubt set a new high record.They nowown an estimated $73billion of corporate bonds which aboutequals the holdingsof all pension fundsand retirement funds,approaches the holdings ofall life insurancecompanies, and about equalsin size the entirecorporate bond market oftenyears ago.4 Thus, wecan conclude that privateinvestors will bea major factor in our corporate bond marketfor manyyears to conicweare not talking about a freaktemporary phenomenonbut about a basicmutation. Now we mightexpect, with (hisupsurge of purchases by individuals. that the secondarymarket forcorporate bonds might havereturned to the floor of the stockexchanges. However,the volume figuresrIo not bear this out. Bond volumeon the New YorkStock Exchange didrise from about $3 billion in 1965to $6.6 billionin 1971 (aided byactivity in conveiblesj and then fellback to $4.4billion in J973.;Private investors probably accounted for mostof this. Rutthese volumefigures are trivial for sucha gigantic marketWhile thereare no volume data forthe corporate bond turnover over thecounteri haveattempted some estimatesbased on the turnover of onebond firm Iknow From thisI guess that the total turnover for all firmsmight have been$150 billionSince these figures count both
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purchases andsales as separate trades---which they are when dealer
xsitiOflS areiflvolvedwe probably should double Our NYSE volume
figures for purposesof comparison. Thus we can say: exchange volume in
1973 amountedto $9 billion; total turnover, $1 50 billion. Finally, gross
newcorporate bond issues came to$22 billion. Clearly the bond market
has notreturned to the exchange in spite of the large influx of private
investors.
While there are no accurate statistics,I suspect that most of those recent
purchases byprivate investors were of new issuesthat is to say, over-
thecounter transactions.Many new issues have been listed, but the
secondary market forodd lots is still poor. Thus we are in a dilemma: our
secondary market machinery isbeautifully adapted to trading large lots
with jnstitutiOflS, and atthe same time a large part of the buyers now want
small lots. Underwritingspreads have adjusted down to a level where
institutional round-lot business is worthwhile, but where small-lot business
often does not pay foritself.
Take the example of a hungry registered representative at a regional
office whose good friend walks in one dayand asks advice on how to
invest his first $10,000. If thesalesman mentions mutual funds, his gross
conimissiorl earnings will be $800 or so for his firm; if he mentions listed
stocks, they may be $300; if he mentions high-grade new-issue bonds, they
may be $100; and ifseasoned bond issues, they may only be $50. And yet
the least rewarding of these securities might be the best investment.There
is something wrong with a commission schedule coveringsuch a wide
range.
Furthermore, the day-to-day changes in the bond market do not suitthe
modus operandi of the private investor.If on thinking things over he
decides to buy a new corporate bond issue mentioned to him lastweek, by
the time he gets back to his broker it is apt to be gone and a newer new
issue wilt be mentioned. In Europe, I understand, and I am not up todate
on this, new-issue books are often kept openfor a month or two and
underwriting spreads are large; so a private investor business is very
worthwhile.It will be important for us to perfect a marketmechanism
which can serve both institutions and individuals and adequatelyreward
both types of dealings. Sooner or later the private investor must payfor the
service he receives or do without.
RELEVANCE TO THE STOCK MARKET
For a number of years now, many observers have predictedthat in time
the stock markets will follow the example of the bond market andleave the
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exchanges. In the over-the-counter market, the large
IflStitItjO,)àI
im.esto, would obtain privacy along with abilityIC)negotiate bothPriceand commission and the opportunity to trade in Size With trading
t)artners of l own choosing. An important start in this direction has already
beenmade and if it were not for the advent of block Positioning,
institutionalStock trading would no doubt have gone niiich further thanit has
tOward the over-the-counter market.
At this point, however, the government entered thepicture All ofth0 advantages of over-the-counter trading to institutionsare disadvantages
to the private investor. He is in a poor position tonegotiate eitherprice o commission, and privacy is a danger to him rather thanan advantage
The tape is an invaluable protection to him provided it iscarefully policand not used for misleading advertisements. A centralized
auction marketis an invaluable advantage to him if the alternativeis shoppingaround ja dealer niarket, especially as few dealers wouldbe interested intrading small lots at good prices. And the privateinvestor, large andsmall, remains an important factor in our captal markets andour economy
For these reasons, an effort isnow underway by the exchanges,
the SEC. and the Congress, to reorganizeour methods of stock trading,so that the private investor as wellas the institutions will beprotected and, indeed
encouraged. This symposium reflectsour interest in that effort. Igather that a unified tape or tapes are in prospect whichwould bring largeparts of the over-the-counter market into the fulllight of publicity andthus protect private investors and depriveinstitutions of their privacy.This, however, would require farmore rigorous policing thanever before, since allsorts of people might haveaccess to those tapes. This is alsotrue of the proposed consolidated quotationsystem. Under theseinnovations and especiallyif commissions are negotiated,there seems littlereason to suppose that trading in listed stockswill abandon theexchanges. In themeantime, however, our marketwill Continue far fromperfect.Ihave seen no proposalthat would providealarge-sizedinstitutionalmarket with adequate dealer capital.There is an irreconcilabledifference between the trading preferencesof large institutionsand of private investors,and this will probablycontinue indefinitely.
THE ORIGtNSOF THE BONDMARKET
Now I am goingto take youway back severalcenturies to the origin of our capital marketsbecause I believeit containssome important lessons for us today andsome suggestiveanalogies Iwill start with the Reformation, cIrca 1550. Beforethat timecredit was illegal,or illicit, in most of Euro;
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there wasplenty of credit, but it was under the counter. Bankerswere
ashamed of their professionand purchased forgiveness by financing lotsof
lovely cathedrals.There Were trade bulls and foreign exchangetransactions
betweenmerchants at high rates. The credit of princes was wretched---
royal defaults were common.The credit of bankers and of the free cities of
northern Europeand Italy was much better.
Then came the Reformationand the whole credit picturewas altered.
Martin Luther and otherreformers said credit was licit at moderate rates:
Luther liked 5 percent,Calvin went up to 6 percent. Just at that time trade
with the New World andthe Indies became active and merchant adven-
turersdemanded credit.
The first nation to set up a real capital market was the new little Dutch
republic. This was an amazing episode. The new country was only a few
sandy islands in the North Sea, and it was in the midst of an eighty-year
war of liberationfrom the vast Spanish Empire. It needed money to hire
German mercenaries to help fightthe Spanish on land. The Dutch them-
selves could manage thugs at sea. The Bank of Amsterdam was set up to
receive deposits, and it was so meticulous that its drafts often commanded
premiums over gold and silver coinage. The provinces of the republic
borrowed on long term. They sold what they called perpetual annuities
secured only by the general credit of the province or city or of the country
as a whole. These were ineffect perpetual bonds with a fixed rate of
interest. They had no maturity dates at all, but carried the privilege of the
debtor to redeem on or after some future date, the further away the better.
These perpetual annuities proved very popular with the wealthy Dutch
burghers who were growing rich with their South Sea trade. Through them
it was possible to retire from trade with a good income and providefor
one's family. Since the burghers controlled the government, they were
really lending to themselves, and they had absolute confidence intheir
brother officials.Large amounts were sold, but the totals were never
revealed.
These perpetual annuities soon developed a secondary marketand sold
at premiums or discounts. Their market, however, wasof a very primitive
sort since each annuity contract was individual to itself.At first the rates
they paid were medieval rates, usually 81/8 percent. However, theDutch
perpetuals became so popular in the seventeenth century that aseries of
remarkable refuridings in Holland brought the rate down to 6 percent,then
5 percent, then 4 percentwithout any official manipulation.The wealthy
Dutch wept at the interest cuts, and there were investor riots.But they
ended up accepting the cuts. At that time short-term tradecredits were
available in Holland at rates as low as 3 percent. TheAmsterdam Stock
Exchange went indoors in 1613, and soon began to tradethose annuities
as well as stocks in the overseas trading companies. TheDutch at that time
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developed most of our modern stock-trading techniqtes
auctionsbulls bears, margins, short selling, options, market letters and,I do no
doubt touting. promotion, and manipulation.
In those financial innovations, we find one reason why tiny little
Holland
won its war with the gigantic Spanish Empire. At the very same time
that
the estates of Holland were borrowing at 3 percent short and4percent long, the king of Spain was paying 60 percent for illicit loans
and then
defaultingin spite of all the gold and silver of the NewWorld
Of course,itwas not long before the Dutch financial
System was imitated elsewhere. In 1688 William of Orange, the Dutch
stadholder
became William Ill of England, and he brought with him whatthe Torj
sneeringly called "Dutch finance." Soon the Bank of Englandwas found.
ed, and interest rates came down from medieval levels.Englishperpetual annuities were sold, first at 8 percent, then 7 percent, then4 percent.
Finally in 1 752 most of the English national debtwas refunded as a single
issue of perpetual marketable bonds, the famous Consols,which are still
outstanding. They were 3s at par andwere later to he refundedas 21/25
They were very popular and sold at smallpremiums in times ofpeace and
big discounts in times of war, and theyare now at 22.
The British made two improvementson the Dutch annuities. Theltrst
was uniformity: the Consols were interchangeable andcould be actively
traded. The second was full disclosure ofpublic finance. The Dutchestates
kept their total credit secret. Here,too, the British Whigs hadconfidence in their government, since theycontrolled it. Therewere no more divine
rights of kings, no more royal defaults.They loved the idea oftaxes for
their own benefit, andsoon Consols were the most popular ofinvestments. In this way over thenext two centuries the British floateda vast quantity
of debt. By thismeans they not only financed theirindustrial revolution, but boughtan empire on the cuff.
Of course,in the nineteenthcentury Dutch-British finance spread around the world whereverthere were strong stablegovernments which
commanded confidence.Alexander Haniilton broughtthe system over here, although itwas some time before itwas fully adopted. All of his original bond issueswere perpetuals (usually 6s)with no maturity date, but
redeemable altera long period ofyears at the discretion of the government. All were redeemedby 1835or so.
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hundred years or so,but later came down. We in the United States have, of
course,relied on this credit systemnot only to help win two world wars,
but also togrow rapidlyand to extend our influence far and wide around
the world.I am sorry to say Ifear we have also overexploited our fabulous
moneymarkets.
CONFIDENCE ANDBUSINESS ETHICS
Now I come tothe point of all this history. There were certain essential
common denonhinators,certain intangibles, that made those capital mar-
kets possible inHolland, then England, then here and elsewhere. it is no
accident that it allstarted with the Reformation and the development in
northern Europe oflimited monarchies and semidemocracies and with
them standards ofbusiness ethics for governments and for individual
traders. There was forthe first time confidence between governments and
subjects and among theleaders of the various business comniuriities. This
was an essentialprerequisite to an effective capital market. The Dutch
could do it only when theygoverned themselves and could set up a trading
community based on mutualconfidence. The British could only follow suit
when they had deposed the Stuartkings and established a constitutional
monarchy and a City of London where mencould trade together freely and
with confidence that contracts, evenverbal contracts, would almost always
be honored. Democracy andthe rule of law was, no doubt, a big factor.
Confidence in government was essential.
There are, of course, many countries inthe world today where these
preconditions for effective capital markets justdo not exist. Spain has
defaulted on her debt four times every centurysince Isabella, and her
former colonies in South America have a poorrecord of debt service.
Some years ago the International MonetaryFund twice asked me to go to
two Latin American countries to helptheni "set up a money market."I did
not think the effort would be fruitful, soItold them what I would say:
"Bring me ten men of substance who havesuch high integrity thatthey
have perfect confidence in each other to the pointof accepting unlimited
verbal commitments from each other, and I willshow them how to start a
modern money market." Needless to sayIheard nothing further about
those proposed trips. And yet just this is aprecondition of a realmodern
money market.
Some years ago two traders from a smallAsiatic countryvisited me in
New York in the course of a study they weremaking of ourcapital
markets. They were impressed by SalomonBrothers' trading roomand
wanted to know just how it worked. They asked me justhow we managed
387to get out of a trade when the market had declined by delivery
date,
course, I said we did not even try, but I couki tell by their smiles
that the did not wholly believe me.
Today we are inclined to take our standards of business
ethics ior granted. Alas, this can be dangerous. For decades the New
York stock Exchange has maintained a relatively high standard ofbusinessethics in Wall Streetrecently with the aid of the SECnot perfect,but
nevertheless relatively high compared with many other business
communities Verbal commitments are held binding, and defaults by membersare rare Other
exchanges no doubt do the same thing for theircommunities lnstjtut10
attempt the same thing through self-discipline and
government supervision
I am not talking about a puritan ethic or a religious creed,but onlySimple business ethics of the sort that is essential in theworlds of finance
Maintaining business standards between traders in WallStreet svas rela.
tively easy up to now because of the small size oftine exchangecomrnu. nity, the overriding power of the exchange, andits close andpersona! supervision ofits members. But now that the privilegeof dealing in
securities and money is being considered theconstitutional privilegeof anybody with a little money anda seemingly clean record, themainte. nance in our capital markets of the liquidity thatcomes only from
confidence will be muchmore difficult, perhaps impossible.
There has been much criticism ofour exchanges as clubs, andsome of
this criticism is valid. But thereare certain advantages of clubs. Onlythey can pick and choose their membership accordingto their own standards
and can exert effective hour-to-hoursupervision.
Ihave rarely heard ethicaland political standardsbrought into a
financial discussion suchas this, but yet they are basic and alwayshave
been. Today, standards ofbehavior are changing aroundthe world. Some
standards are relaxing, othersare broadening and becomingmore humane. Those who dislike therelaxations use the pejorativeword "permissive";
those who like themuse the approving words "reform"or "open minded."
These trends of changeare spreading to our great capitalmarkets. As we go ahead deniocratizing
our financial procedures, I hopewe will not lose sight of the basicand rigid ethicalstandards that have always been
essential to effective capitalmarkets. I hopewe do not reform ourselves to the point wherewe take a permissiveattitude toward defaults. I realize thatour Country and its capitalmarkets have outgrown the days when they could beruled by clubs andwhen the elder J. P. Morgan could set ethical standards
create financial trends, andpersonally provide liquid- ity to the financialcommunity. In those dayseverybody important in finance knewpersonally everybodyelse of importance,Deviants from the accepted ethicalstandards of themarketplace were quickly known and shunned.
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Today wehave outgrown this,and we are forced to substitute sonic
much more
impersonal policing by agencies of the government and by
largetrade assoCiaflOflS.We muict remember that no mere policingc
effectivC litis not reinforcedby ethical standards accepted and indeed
dictated by thecommunitY as a whole. At all times social pressure is an
essentialppOto any system of ethicalstandards, and an effective
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